The case of Dutch convicted cocaine trafficker Jos Leijdekkers, reportedly living in Sierra Leone under the name Omar Sheriff, illustrates the challenge. Dutch authorities say they have known of his whereabouts since 2024 and have repeatedly sought his extradition. On November 2, 2026, they increased the reward for information leading to his arrest to €2 million.
Leijdekkers was sentenced to 24 years in prison in the Netherlands for major cocaine shipments, armed robbery and ordering a murder. He also received a lengthy sentence in Belgium. His continued presence in Sierra Leone, despite repeated extradition requests, has become a major diplomatic and law enforcement issue. Allegations of high-level protection have further intensified scrutiny, although these should be distinguished from independently established findings of individual criminal responsibility.
But the Leijdekkers case is only one illustration of a much larger regional problem. The 2025 Africa Organised Crime Index identified West Africa as the continent's most affected region for cocaine trafficking, with a regional criminality score of 6.67. More recently, research published in 2026 highlighted the growing influence of state-linked actors, foreign criminal organisations and regional intermediaries in facilitating cocaine movements. Synthetic drugs are also expanding rapidly, bringing additional public health and security concerns to countries including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.
International drug syndicates do not operate through ports, airports and border crossings without networks of local intermediaries. Their operations can depend on compromised officials, corrupt security personnel, financial facilitators and businesses that help conceal criminal proceeds.
This is where the crisis becomes particularly dangerous. When public institutions are vulnerable to bribery or political interference, enforcement becomes selective. Couriers and street-level dealers may be arrested while those financing, coordinating and protecting the trade remain beyond the reach of the law.
However, allegations of government involvement must be investigated rather than applied indiscriminately to entire administrations. The critical requirement is independent investigation, transparency and accountability, regardless of political position.
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria cannot address this challenge independently. Criminal networks move across borders, exploit differences in national laws and take advantage of gaps in intelligence-sharing and enforcement. The response must therefore include joint investigations, stronger border controls, effective extradition arrangements, independent prosecution and cooperation on financial intelligence. Authorities must also investigate unexplained wealth and pursue the assets generated by trafficking.
Regional initiatives already exist, including the West Africa Coast Initiative, which supports law enforcement, border management, anti-money-laundering measures and stronger criminal justice institutions. The challenge is ensuring that these commitments produce measurable results.
Completely eradicating drug trafficking may be unrealistic while international demand and the enormous profits from the trade remain. But West Africa can make the region significantly less attractive to criminal organisations.
That requires more than public declarations, occasional seizures and arrests. It requires governments to demonstrate that political influence cannot purchase immunity, that security institutions cannot be privately controlled and that criminal wealth cannot be safely concealed.
Ultimately, the real measure of success will not be how many traffickers are arrested at the borders, but whether the people financing, protecting and directing these operations can also be brought before the law. West Africa cannot win the war against drug trafficking while the networks that enable it remain untouched.
